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Two optimistic traditions in the dismal science: rationalism and the 
"invisible hand" 
 








This  paper  explores  two  traditions  of  optimism  in  economics.  In  one  of  these  traditions 
optimism is based on the comprehension of a spontaneous (and often progressive) order in a 
decentralised  (or  market)  economy  –  what  I  will  call  the  optimism  of  the  “invisible  hand”. 
Against the optimism of  the  invisible  hand  stands another optimistic tradition  in  economics, 
whereby  we  might  take  courage  from  our  ability  to  do  right  by  society  through  instructing 
governments  with  the  keen  edge  of  our  most  enlightened  plans.  This  tradition  is  called 
“constructivist  rationalism”  here.  The  paper  explores  the  logic  of  each  tradition  and  their 
historical development and applies both to a recent example of policy making in South Africa: 
government’s  fundamental  regulatory  overhaul  of  the  pharmaceutical  industry  based  on  the 
Medicines Act of 1997, specifically, the decision to implement price controls on medicines. 
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“Compared with this method of solving the economic problem by means of decentralisation plus automatic co-
ordination, the more obvious method of central direction is incredibly clumsy, primitive and limited in scope.” 
Friedrich Hayek (1944: 37) 
 
“For simplicity let me describe how to attack the problem for a given political party… 
the expert [economist/econometrician] will go back to his electronic computer in which he had already entered 
the data regarding the core of the economy. To this he will now add the formalization of the preferences in the 
quantitative form as he now sees it. From this will come out a solution, in the form of an optimal development 
path for the economy.”  
Ragnar Frisch (1970: 31-32) 
Introduction 
Optimism is a strange topic for an economist, a practitioner of a science so peculiarly dismal that even the grave 
does not evoke sympathy; as Walter Bagehot observed a long time ago, “the public has never yet been sorry to 
hear of the death of an economist” 2. Yet, not long after Bagehot’s observation an economist of rising reputation 
mentioned  that a great  teacher  of  his said “if he  had  seven sons they  should  all  study  economics”  3. Such 
optimism, at least in a tempered version, is encountered frequently enough within economics and I have chosen 
to speak about two traditions that support these optimisms.  
 
In one of these traditions, optimism is based on the comprehension of a spontaneous (and often progressive) 
order  in  a  decentralised  (or  market)  economy  –  what  I  will  call  the  optimism  of  the  “invisible  hand”. 
Paradoxically, it is this optimistic tradition that earned economics the label of “dismal science” from the pen of 
Thomas Carlyle. Since the story of this insult is both interesting and relevant to the topic at hand I will summarise 
it briefly.  
 
Until recently an author of considerable authority4 could claim that Carlyle had called economics the “dismal 
science” upon reading the grim Malthusian predictions of population growth outstripping the expansion of the 
food supply. Others have found in economics a “dismal science” which incessantly studies the trade-offs between 
competing wants and needs; trade-offs required by the limited means at our disposal; it’s guns or butter. Or as 
Lord Robbins (1932 [1962]: 15) said, economics reminds us that “We have been turned out of Paradise”.  
 
More recent scholarship has, however, brought into question these widely held explanations for Carlyle’s insult.  
David Levy has argued that the original context in which Carlyle labelled economics the “dismal science” was the 
struggle to end slavery in the British Empire. And what made economics so dismal was the economist’s optimism 
                                                       
2 Bagehot’s remark is recorded in Hayek (1944 [1991]: 39). 
3 Hayek (1944 [1991]: 35) told this story about the famous late-nineteenth-century economist Carl Menger.  
4 Robert Heilbroner (Heilbroner, 1953 [1991]).  
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that emancipated slaves, since they share our common humanity, would be quite capable of living lives of virtue 
and prosperity without the paternalistic hands of their former owners. Of course this only sounds dismal to 
those, like Carlyle and Ruskin, who fancied for themselves a greater role in guiding the so-called inferior slave 
races to gainful labour and, perhaps, civilisation. Only a “dismal science”, cried Carlyle, “…finds the secret of this 
Universe in ‘supply and demand’, and reduces the duty of human governors to that of letting men alone” (Carlyle, 
1849 [1897]: 353-354). 
 
But there was more to the economist’s optimism for emancipated slaves than the doctrine of the “rights of man”; 
there was also a conception of society in which the actions of each, focussed as they are on needs and benefits 
perceived by the decision-maker and informed by her information set and budget constraints, serve the needs of 
others – as if guided by an invisible hand – in a complex and spontaneous order that is the result of human 
decisions but not of human design.  We must look here – at the theory of spontaneous order – for the wellspring 
of one tradition of optimism in economics.  
 
Against the optimism of the invisible hand stands another optimistic tradition in economics, whereby we might 
take courage from our ability to do right by society through instructing governments with the keen edge of our 
most enlightened plans. I will use “rationalism”, or more precisely “constructivist rationalism”5, for optimism of 
this second kind. The tension between these two groups of optimists runs through the history of economic 
thought and both groups include leading economists in their ranks.  
 
1. Order and optimism  
 
Let me start with a small amount of housekeeping on the terminology concerning two concepts: optimism and 
order. By optimism I do not mean the Panglossian doctrine that ours is the “best of all possible worlds”, or the 
doctrine that some  conception of the “good”  will  ultimately  triumph  over  “evil”.  By  optimism I  mean  the 
expectation that, whatever our present troubles, our society has the capacity for improvement to meet these 
challenges. It is the kind of optimism found in the work of the philosopher Karl Popper (for example, Popper, 
1997).     
 
The optimism just described is centred on society, and that is also the reason for defining order as patterns of 
behaviour by individuals in a society which are mutually consistent to such an extent that each person is able to 
pursue her several goals. Such order requires a highly successful co-ordinating mechanism, and it is about the 
nature of this mechanism that the two traditions of optimism discussed here will part ways.  
 
The focus on order is necessary to sustain the optimism of either tradition. Optimism implies an expectation of a 
better future and it is only in a social order that a person might find the unfolding events consistent with her 
expectations. By implication, the analysis precludes revolutions. One cannot form expectations about revolutions.  
 
                                                       
5 Hayek (1988) used the term “constructivist rationalism” for this tradition in economics.  
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Allow me an example from my own field of macroeconomics to illustrate the debate between proponents of the 
two types of optimism in economics. Sweden’s monetary system was under severe pressure in 1931, as the Krona 
suffered speculative attacks in the wake of Britain moving off the gold standard in September of that year (Berg 
and Jonung, 1998). The government of the day turned to Swedish economists for advice, especially Cassel and 
Heckscher, who suggested a new framework for monetary policy organised around an explicit target for the price 
level (Bäckström, 1996). This regime places a limit on the policy discretion of the Central Bank, and is based on 
the optimistic expectation that the market economy would provide for a general increase in prosperity, if the 
monetary system provided a stable backdrop for market exchanges, together with the view that the exercise of 
monetary discretion would often itself be destabilising.  
 
I want to emphasise that this was not “conservative” policy advice, if “conservative” means obstructing change or 
expressing some longing for a past order or for preserving some conception of the status quo distribution of 
income and wealth (see also, Hayek, 1960). And it was a success: the price level stabilised and Sweden was spared 
the worst of the recession, which had, especially in the USA, been associated with grave mistakes by monetary 
policy-makers (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963; Mundell, 2000) – mistakes which would probably not have been 
made under a price-level target. 
 
In 1937 the price-level target came up for evaluation, and though it received a favourable review from a panel of 
economists, a group of young economists, including Ohlin and Myrdal, turned the public debate in favour of a 
more ambitious role for monetary policy (Berg and Jonung, 1998). These economists were optimistic too, but 
based their optimism on a very different model of the economy and of the role of monetary policy: the economy 
was depressingly unstable, or so they believed, but economists – who understood the malaise – might wield the 
tools of policy, like engineers or dentists as Keynes (1931) would famously have it, to correct these faults and 
restore the prosperity. 
  
But in Sweden during the thirties the results were less commendable. There, as elsewhere, removing limits to the 
discretion  on  monetary  policy-makers  had  unfortunate  consequences.  Sweden  was  not  spared  the  sustained 
inflation which affected market economies in the post-War era, and which can plausibly be connected to a 
mistaken model of the economy in which monetary policy plays an expanded role. Once lost, it would take sixty 
years, and a switch to inflation-targeting, for the kind of monetary stability to return which Sweden had enjoyed 
between 1931 and 1937. 
 
2. Rationalism: a first optimistic tradition 
 
The optimistic tradition that I will call “constructivist rationalism” has ancient roots reaching back at least to the 
Greek philosophers of the first millennium BC, especially to Plato. A critical distinction underlies much of this 
tradition, i.e. the distinction between “natural” and “social” regularities, where the latter is the result of deliberate 
human design and the former should be regarded as given and immutable. This was not usually an optimistic 
tradition, as it often regarded the society of the day as a degenerative version of an earlier more robust state  
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(Popper, 1966). Not surprisingly this tradition was often profoundly conservative, and it was only in the 17th 
century, but especially during Enlightenment of the 18th century, that it received an optimistic reformulation. 
From  Descartes  onwards  an  important  line  of  Western  thinkers  –  including  especially  Rousseau,  the 
Encyclopaedists, and Comte – argued that, if people had designed some of the important institutions in society, 
people might also change them and that Reason might guide their reforming hands. It is this optimistic version of 
rationalism that Hayek calls Cartesian or Constructivist rationalism (Hayek, 1945 [1984]-a, 1988).  
 
But more interesting for my purpose is that the first school of economists, the Physiocrats of 18th century, stand 
in  this  tradition.  They  –  like  so  many  progressive  thinkers  of  their  province  and  time  –  were  enthusiastic 
proponents of the Natural Law, especially of the branch that argued for the application of Natural Law reasoning 
to society6 (Gide and Rist, 1964). The various Natural Law doctrines shared three main themes (Berlin, 1997: 
171). First, they conceived of a distinct “human nature” which could, in principle, be understood. Second, this 
human nature implied certain specific human goals following from the very design of the human being by an 
impersonal  nature,  or  God.  And,  finally,  these  goals  were  harmonious  between  people  and  with  the  laws 
governing nature. Such assumptions might yield a model of the natural social order to the talented theorist, and 
that is precisely what the Tableau Économique did for the leading Physiocrat, Dr Quesnay. 
 
I have tried to construct a fundamental Tableau of the economic order for the purpose of displaying 
expenditure and products in a way which is easy to grasp, and for the purpose of forming a clear opinion 
about the organisation and disorganisation which government can bring about… you have seen the 
tableau in these days - it is a way of meditating on the present and on the future.7 
 
These  were  optimistic  insights,  but  also  centralising,  as  a  prominent  Physiocrat,  Le  Mercier  de  la  Rivière 
explained: “the despotism of the laws and the personal despotism of the lawgiver are one and same: that of the 
irresistible power of evidence” (quoted in  Berlin, 1997: 173). Though they respected liberty and wanted to extend 
the scope of free initiative, especially in economic matters, they also argued that the informed exercise of freedom 
by the citizens will, necessarily, co-ordinate with the plans of an enlightened ruler.  
 
“The problem” for the Physiocrats, said Lord Acton (2000: 10), “is to enlighten the ruler, not to restrain him”. In 
the dark years leading up to the French Revolution these economists, impressed as they were with the immense 
social problems of their day, reasoned that though society was in no position to recover under its own steam, the 
government which  had ruined it might still recover its  prosperity. They stood  ready  “to  undo  the  work of 
absolutism by the hand of absolutism… Transformation, infinitely more difficult in itself than preservation, was 
not more formidable to the economists because it consisted mainly in revoking the godless work of a darker age” 
(Acton, 2000: 11). 
 
A contemporary South African will be struck by the following familiar themes from the story of the Physiocrats: 
the appreciation of immense social problems; the clear understanding that a former government was responsible 
                                                       
6 Hence the name by which they came to call themselves, Physiocrats, from the Greek physis (natural) and kratos (power). 
7 Extract from a letter by Quesnay to his disciple Mirabeau, reproduced in Meek  (1962: 71).  
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for  all  these  problems;  the  doubt  that  society  would  be  dynamic  enough  to  meet  these  challenges  without 
government  taking  the  leading  role  in  transforming  society;  and,  finally,  the  conclusion  that  to  effect  such 
transformation, government must not be restrained, as would perhaps have been wise if the needs of society were 
simply preservative. We will encounter these ideas again below.   
 
These Physiocratic doctrines, with their unhappy consequences in France, did not, however, enter the main line 
of economic thinking, which at that time was already developing in Scotland. My interest this evening lies chiefly 
in the emergence of this rationalism in the mainstream of economics during the 1930s.  
 
The Great Depression of the early thirties dealt a tremendous blow to the public’s confidence in a decentralised 
or market-based society across the industrialised world,  especially in  England, but  also  in America.  Leading 
English  economists,  such  as  John Maynard Keynes, no  longer  believed  in the efficacy  of the market’s self-
correcting mechanism (Keynes, 1936). He thundered that economists, who were confident that the hard times 
would eventually pass, had set themselves a useless task when they might be assisting the recovery in the short 
run (Keynes, 1923). In  this climate Keynes wrote to Hayek to congratulate him on his book The Road to Serfdom 
(1944) and to share his agreement with much of the analysis (see the letter in Harrod’s (1972 [1951]) biography of 
Keynes). Yet, from the same premises Keynes concluded more or less the opposite, i.e. “what we want is not no 
planning, or even less planning, indeed I should say that we almost certainly want more planning”.  
 
At the root of their disagreement was that Keynes, like the Physiocrats before him, assumed what Hayek would 
not, i.e. that our goals, yours and mine, are ultimately consistent. The Physiocrats based this assumption on the 
Natural Law, while Keynes assumed it would follow from what he called restoring “right moral thinking”. Keynes 
believed “dangerous acts can be done safely in a community which thinks and feels rightly, which would be the 
way to hell if they were executed by those who think and feel wrongly.” If harmonised morally, society would be 
in a position to enjoy the “fruits” of planning, as Keynes called it. Contra Keynes, Hayek (1973) has - with respect 
to the coercive power of government - insisted that “it will certainly remain an exceedingly dangerous power so 
long as we believe that it will do harm only if wielded by bad men.” 
 
Keynesianism was  an  important,  but  not  the  only,  avenue  along  which  constructivist  rationalism  re-entered 
economic  thinking  during  the  thirties  and  especially  the  post-War  period.  Economic  theory  received  a 
formalisation and an extension to welfare economics from the thirties to the fifties at the hands of the great 
theorists Samuelson, Hicks, Arrow, Debreu and others.  
 
Amongst these theoretical advances was the discovery that the actual economy differed in many respects from 
the idealised economies in our models, where assumptions about “perfect competition” and the rationality of the 
model’s  actor,  “economic  man”,  had  delivered  such  encouraging  results  in  the  hands  of  the  old  masters 
(Chamberlin,  1933;  Robinson,  1933).  In  these  theories  competition  was  thought  to  be  a  matter  of  market 
structure, essentially the number and size of firms involved in markets, and market failure seemed to be an ever-
present danger if actual markets fell short, as they more or less have to, from the infinitely dispersed market  
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structure of the formal theory (Stigler, 1988). Nor was monopoly the only pathology of modern industrialised 
economies;  externalities  also  caused  markets  to  fail  and  governments  had  assumed  the  task  of  stabilising 
economic fluctuations (Tanzi, 1997). 
 
Meanwhile the econometric society was founded in the early thirties and the first macroeconometric models 
appeared just before World War II. These models promised to guide the hands of governments as they wrestled 
with the many shortcomings that economists were discovering in the market economy. A quotation from Ragnar 
Frisch – a leading econometrician of that era, and the first winner of the Nobel prize in economics – shows the 
optimism of that generation of constructivist rationalists.  
 
“For simplicity let me describe how to attack the problem for a given political party… 
the expert [economist/econometrician] will go back to his electronic computer in which he had already entered 
the data regarding the core of the economy. To this he will now add the formalization of the preferences in the 
quantitative form as he now sees it. From this will come out a solution, in the form of an optimal development 
path for the economy.”  
Ragnar Frisch (1970: 31-32) 
 
Frisch emphasises the role of the econometric model, which comprehensively captures the dynamic structure of 
the economy, the formalisation of the political preferences and the optimality of the answer which the computer 
would  yield  in  the  hands  of  the  skilful  expert.  Now,  these  plans  of  constructivist  rationalism  are  always 
inadequate, whether made by great economists like Frisch or experts of lesser skill; I will discuss the logical 
reasons for this failure later in this lecture, but let us first consider the consequences of this failure.   
 
The failure of comprehensive or system wide plans does not just deliver a slightly more boring version of the 
dynamic  spontaneous  order  society,  as  I  was  often  told  at  school.  I’m  sure  you  also  know  the  following 
apocryphal stories too: Nikita Khrushchev, on a visit to America, believed that the American government had 
stocked - for the purposes of propaganda - the shelves of supermarkets with the immense variety of goods we 
take for granted; or the story that in the Soviet Union everybody had to have the same brand television set. But 
this focus on the lack of choice (though true) was misplaced, since the crucial points were (i) the difficulty of 
getting a television set, or the empty shelves in Soviet shops and (ii) the unfortunate habit of these television sets 
to explode. Soviet plans were not a little off, but wildly inadequate (North, 2005). The following extract from a 
visitor’s journal to Poland during the sixties demonstrates this failure:  
 
‘The great mistake you Westerners make about us,’ another Polish acquaintance said, ‘is that you think 
we are enslaved by a rigidly organised system from which one cannot escape. But the truth is that there is 
no real system. There is a state of continual disorder. Planners make small miscalculations which lead to 
enormous mistakes. And the ordinary man spends a lot of his time picking his way through the chaos.’ 
(Pritchett, 1964: 50) 
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Lest you think these problems are only associated with full blown communism and not the garden variety of 
systematic planning in our mixed economies, I want to remind you of the tremendous difficulties experienced by 
the American government in the face of hurricane Katrina’s destruction of New Orleans in August 2005. Far 
from showing the bankruptcy of a decentralised market-based society, the response to this disaster highlights the 
contrast between problems facing a centralised authority and the tremendous flexibility of civil society; it was, for 
example, parishioners of surrounding churches, who had local networks and knew where people were, who 
rescued them, driving pickup vans into the city, often against federal regulation, and in this way kept the total 
fatalities down to 15% of the expected fatalities from disaster of this size in a  city as large as New Orleans8 
(Boettke, 2006).  
 
Let me return to Frisch: admittedly the quotation is a little outrageous and such hubris should not leave you with 
the impression that modern economic theory and econometrics have been misguided. They have not. What is 
misguided is the belief that they offer a comprehensive or uniquely correct way of seeing the economy, the 
modernist  belief  that  they  “got  it  right”.  Modernism  has  its  limitations  in  economics  too,  especially  when 
theoretical or econometric overconfidence is joined by what McCloskey (2001) calls the “Promethean illusion” of 
social engineering or the “fatal conceit”  as Hayek (1988) called it. And economists have discovered the same in 
various fields since the seventies: in econometrics (Lucas, 1976; Hendry, 1980; Leamer, 1983), in policy-modelling 
(Kydland  and  Prescott,  1977;  Barro  and  Gordon,  1983;  Taylor,  1993),  from  experience  with  policy-making 
(Tanzi, 1997; Fischer, 2005; Tanzi, 2005), with development assistance (Easterly, 2001) and with the help of 
experimental economics (Smith, V.L., 2003).  
 
For these, and many other reasons9, social engineering has since acquired a bad odour and the leading economists 
of our time would not lightly follow Frisch in referring to themselves as “econometricians and social engineers” 
(for example, Frisch, 1970: 24). Though considerably less important in mainstream economic thinking at this 
time, constructivist rationality in economics still plays an important role in our domestic policy discussion. A 
recent and high-profile case was government’s fundamental regulatory overhaul of the pharmaceutical industry 
based on the Medicines Act of 1997. I am going to highlight one specific regulation that has received widespread 
media attention and which will affect all of our lives, i.e. the decision to implement price controls on medicines.  
 
Here, briefly, are the relevant details: The Department of Health convened a pricing committee to decide on a 
dispensing fee for medicines by pharmacies in South Africa. These regulations are intended to give effect to the 
goals in the National Drug Policy to lower the cost of medicine in the country and to encourage “cost effective 
and rational use of drugs” (Minister of Health v New Clicks and others, 2006: 202). At the same time the 
Department  of  Health  is  using  this  regulation  to  encourage  changes  to  the  business  models  of  pharmacies 
towards  becoming  an  industry  with  fewer  pharmacies  using  fewer  pharmacists  and  more  assistants.  In  the 
Department of Health’s view this regulation will enhance the access to health care, which is a constitutionally 
                                                       
8 There were 1600 fatalities compared with the expected 10 000 from a disaster of this magnitude (Boettke, 2006). 
9 Not least of which the ethical concerns which arises from a greatly expanded public sector (Friedman, 1962 [2002]) and the technological 
advances which have made many markets more efficient on the one hand and diminished the technological arguments supporting claims 
of “natural” monopolies, on the other (Tanzi, 2005).  
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protected social and economic right10. 
 
To  that  end  the  pricing  committee  collected  information  about  costs  and  revenues  from  pharmacies,  held 
hearings  with  interested  parties  and  eventually  published  a  schedule  for  dispensing  fees.  These  fees  are 
understood to be the remuneration for the professional services rendered by the pharmacists, while trading in 
medicine, i.e. buying medicine at one price and selling it at another, will now be forbidden. The Department of 
Health believes that the dispensing fees are adequate to ensure the economic survival of those pharmacies with a 
business model that matches the Department’s conception of efficiency (Tshabalala-Msimang, 2006).  
 
A broad alliance of pharmacies objected to these regulations in court, ending ultimately in the Constitutional 
Court. That court ruled that the price regulations as such were “coherent” and consistent with the Medicines Act 
of 1997, and that they would serve the important constitutional principle mentioned earlier. But the Court found 
the precise dispensing fee inadequately justified and asked for some revisions.  
 
This is not the place to comment on the merits of the judgement from a legal perspective and I am certainly not 
the person to do so. So I will restrict my comments to the following economic issues raised by the judges:  
 
1.  A first issue is the matter of compensation for pharmacies. There was widespread agreement amongst the 
judges that the regulations would adversely affect pharmacies11. And though the Court paid lip service to 
the interest of the pharmacies, they offered no compensation for what is a reasonably clear-cut regulatory 
taking12. Justice Ngobo sees, for example, that “No doubt the interests of the pharmacists is a factor to 
be taken into consideration”, but he proceeds immediately with the dismissal “However, they must yield 
to the interests of the general public” (Minister of Health v New Clicks and others, 2006: 519). 
2.  As a second issue, the Constitutional Court regarded the appropriate dispensing fee as an objective 
matter13.  
                                                       
10 Professor McIntyre, the chairperson of the pricing committee, testified to the Constitutional Court on the justification for these far-
reaching regulations. Her arguments fall within the tradition of constructive rationalism under discussion, i.e. she compared her analysis of 
the pharmaceuticals market to some idealised “perfect market” and found, as one would expect, many discrepancies: there is not “perfect 
competition”; consumers don’t have “perfect knowledge”; the demand for medicine is “induced” by the supplier and, in any event, the 
demand for medicine is not price sensitive (Minister of Health v New Clicks and others, 2006: 730).  Not only are there too many 
pharmacies in the country (Minister of Health v New Clicks and others, 2006: 372) with the result that their cost structure is inappropriate, 
Professor  McIntyre  also  assured  the  Court  that  there  are  too  few  pharmacies  in  the  country  with  the  result  that  their  pricing  is 
monopolistic.  
11 Chaskalson found that “The regulation of prices in the disputed regulations adversely affects the rights of pharmacists and other persons 
in the pharmaceutical industry” (Minister of Health v New Clicks and others, 2006: 121). 
Sachs found that “The price tag put on the activity of the pharmacists affects their interest materially adversely and in an immediately 
operative way” (Minister of Health v New Clicks and others, 2006: 646). 
Moseneke found that “At best for the pharmacies the evidence raises the ever-present possibility that the new dispensing fee will exert 
downward pressure on the profitability of pharmacies and that some whose profit margins are already low may be forced to close” 
(Minister of Health v New Clicks and others, 2006: 783). 
12  Van  der  Walt  (1999)  analyses  the  legal  precedents  and  implications  of  compensation  for  regulatory  takings  in  an  international 
perspective, while Du Plessis and Du Plessis (2005) use New Institutional Theory to demonstrate the inefficiency of failing to compensate 
for such takings. 
13 Chaskalson argues that “Although the ‘capped’ fee must be ‘appropriate’, and to that extent is subject to objective criteria, regulation 
5(2)(g) in effect leaves it to the Minister to determine the ‘appropriateness’ of the fee, instead of setting a maximum itself.” 
Ngobo argued that the fee had to be fair to both pharmacists and the public, and added that “its determination requires a consideration of 
conflicting interests of the public who are entitled to access to affordable medicines, on the one hand, and the interests of dispensers who, 
in terms of the Act, are essential to the public for the supply of medicines and whose economic viability is implicitly recognised by the Act 
and is of ‘national importance’, on the other hand” (Minister of Health v New Clicks and others, 2006: 518).  
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3.  The third issue was raised by Justices Sachs and Moseneke. Sachs argued that “the mere fact that a 
government measure could result in service-providers losing their competitive edge so as to face being 
driven  out  of  business,  would  not  in  itself  be  enough  to  make  a  measure  legally  inappropriate 
(unreasonable). The maintenance of ‘business as usual’ is not a constitutional principle, and the concept 
of reasonableness should not be used as an apparently neutral instrument which, regarding the status quo 
as the settled norm, serves to block transformation and freeze challengeable aspects of our public life” 
(Minister of Health v New Clicks and others, 2006: 660). 
 
I will start with the last issue, the argument by Sachs: “In a society where distributions are manifestly unequal and 
unjust,  it  is  a  defence  of  the  status  quo  and  the  failure  to  make  corrective  intervention,  rather  than  a  re-
distributive initiative, that could be open to a charge of unreasonableness.”14 Justice Sachs backed his argument 
with extracts from the book by the American jurist, Cass Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Sunstein, 1993).  
 
There, as elsewhere, Sunstein argues that the protection of property rights (or other legal entitlements, or wealth, 
etc.) should not be seen as neutral, and the violation of these rights by government should not perforce be seen as 
partial or inappropriate. The existing distribution of rights and wealth and income are all a result of the law 
(Sunstein, 1993: 4-5) and he admires the insight of the New Deal Court and President Roosevelt in particular for 
grasping that “We must lay hold of the fact that economic laws are not made by nature. They are made by human 
beings” (Roosevelt, quoted in Sunstein, 1993: 58).  
 
Following Roosevelt – and the long line of this tradition back to the early Greek philosophers – Sunstein argues 
that since social problems, such as poverty, cannot have been caused by nature, they must result from human 
design. Since poverty is the “product of the law”, while the law is in turn the product of the state, Sunstein 
concludes: “We should agree that poverty is in some sense a creation of the state” (Sunstein, 1993: 155). 
 
Before I take issue with this claim, let me recapitulate the rationalist case for optimism in economics, which is 
also shared by Sunstein (from a Public Law perspective). The argument is that there are two types of regularities, 
natural regularities and those regularities caused by human design, call them social regularities. The social ills of 
our society are almost certainly not due to nature, so they must be social regularities. If human design – whether 
expressed through economic laws or legal entitlements – is the cause of social ills, then we could use the sciences 
of economics and of the law to reform the existing order and so remove the social ills.  
 
3. The invisible hand: a second optimistic tradition 
 
The second optimistic tradition in economics, which Pete Boettke (2006) has called the main line of economic 
thought, objects to the very first step of Sunstein’s chain of reasoning: that there are only two categories of 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Sachs argued that “It may be unclear whether the distress of the pharmacists arises from selfinduced [sic] and self-serving panic, or is based 
on objective fact” (Minister of Health v New Clicks and others, 2006: 663) and added that “It is important that the evidence be such as to 
show to all those affected and to the public in general, that the Pricing Committee has, after diligent enquiry into the basic issues involved 
and with a reasonably high degree of likelihood in relation to the material before it, ‘got it right’, or, at the very least, not got it wrong” 
(Minister of Health v New Clicks and others, 2006: 665). 
14 See Minister of Health v New Clicks and others (2006 at 660, footnote 84).  
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regularities, those due to nature and those due to deliberate design. Adam Smith and the other leading figures of 
the Scottish Enlightenment (David Hume, Adam Ferguson, Thomas Reid, Sir James Steuart and John Millar) 
argued that there is yet a third category, regularities which are the result of human action, but not of deliberate 
design (Robertson, 1987).  
 
The existing distribution of property, wealth and income in society, as well as prices, fall into this category. It was 
the great discovery of the Scottish Enlightenment that a spontaneous social order, and not unavoidable chaos, 
could emerge together with a set of institutions that enforce contracts and protect a private sphere of control, as 
indeed had happened historically (Coase, 1937). And it is not logically necessary for a state or even law to exist as 
a condition for the existence of property (Nozick, 1974).  
 
But you don’t have to agree with the theoretical point, as Sunstein’s claim is also false historically. Economists 
have catalogued many different non-state institutions that emerged to serve the protection of property rights: for 
example, coalitions of Maghribi traders of the 11th century (Greif, 1993), Champagne fairs of the 12th and 13th 
centuries (Greif, 1993), the 17th-century Bourse in Amsterdam15 (Greif, 2005), the Commune of Genoa (Greif, 
2005), and cattlemen’s associations, land clubs and mining districts in the American West (Smith, V.L., 2003) to 
name but a few. Not only were there many alternatives to legally enforceable property rights with state backing, 
but there was also, historically, considerable competition between different systems of contract enforcement. The 
observed efficiency of the common law has been explained by, for example Rubin (2005), as the result of a 
rivalrous competition between competing enforcement mechanisms such as the ecclesiastical courts and the civil 
courts, and within the latter between royal, feudal, manorial, urban and mercantile law. This turns the table on 
Sunstein’s argument: historically and logically, the common law developed in response to, and evolved with, the 
needs of the expanding market. 
 
A decentralised economy works by allowing individuals to specialise on their own initiative and then to provide 
for the remainder of their needs through exchange. However, decentralised order requires, at a minimum, secure 
property and contract rights and an extravagant amount of information. It was not in the tradition of the Scottish 
Enlightenment to solve this problem of information by assuming ‘perfect’ knowledge either for individuals, or for 
some social planner. Rather, the emphasis was on people’s epistemological limitations. For Hayek (1945 [1984]-a) 
this modest view of human capacity, or what he calls the “constitutional limitations of man’s knowledge and 
interests, the fact that he cannot know more than a tiny part of the whole society and that therefore all that can 
enter into his motives are the immediate effects which his actions will have in the sphere he knows”, is the central 
problem in economics.   
 
Co-operation between people in such an order leads a person, or group, in Adam Smith’s famous argument, “by 
an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. … By pursuing his own interest he 
frequently promotes that of society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it” (Smith, A., 1776 
                                                       
15 “The Bourse in Amsterdam was the most important and best organised in Europe during the seventeenth century. Yet, many of the 
financial instruments traded in it, such as short sales, forward contracts, options, and hypothecation of shares as collateral, were either in 
legal limbo or actually illegal. Reputation sustained trade until the time when these instruments became legal” (Greif, 2005: 752).   
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[1981]: 456).  
 
This “invisible hand” is a metaphor for the co-ordinating mechanism of a decentralised society and it refers to the 
feedback mechanism, often prices, but quantities too, that signal to the participants whether their decisions and 
expectations are consistent with the decisions and expectations of others16 (Barry, 1982). And these signals are 
usually generated under the pressure of competition, where competition is the rivalrous process of “decentralised 
planning by separate persons” (Hayek, 1945 [1984]-b: 79).  
 
Competition means something very different in this context than it had done in the discussion of the rationalist 
tradition.  In  the  invisible  hand  tradition  competition  is  a  behavioural  concept,  which  McNulty  (1967)  has 
suggested we might associate with the verb “to compete” (see also, Hayek, 1946 [1984]). The competition that 
moves the invisible hand – and co-ordinates the spontaneous order – is a rivalrous process and not much related 
to market structure (Hayek, 1946 [1984]).  
 
However, to compete in this sense of the word requires institutions – or rules of the game (North, 1984, 1990, 
1991) –  that would help to identify successful strategies. Such institutions include those required to enforce 
contract rights and those required to define and protect property rights. The latter also implies institutions to limit 
the scope of the state, even or perhaps especially where it is the state that is charged with the enforcement of 
contract and property rights (Greif, 2005).  
 
A decentralised economy is not without planning, rather instead of comprehensive plans there are what Coase 
(1991 [1994]) called “areas of planning” embedded in a complex market. Firms, for example, are such “areas of 
planning”; In New Orleans, again, there was planning by the various groups in civil society too: the distinction is 
between  “areas  of  planning”  based  on  voluntary  co-operation  and  system  wide  planning,  often  based  on 
coercion. A spontaneous  order  society  is  one where the actions  of  these areas of planning are coordinated 
without coercion, even though none of the planners can conceive of the order in advance.  
 
Some of the critical features of the spontaneous order society which I have been describing are: the centrality of 
individual decision-makers that act on local information and the far-reaching impact of local decisions; a modest 
view of the capacity of any specific decision-maker, including politicians and bureaucrats; feedback to these 
decision-makers about their decisions and plans through a highly non-linear process of competition in which the 
price system plays a central role - a process that disseminates information and co-ordinates the activities of the 
many participating decision-makers, creating a social order as a result of purposeful action by the participants, 
even though that order was not their intention. The order that emerges from such interaction will be influenced 
by its history (we call it path dependence), but not in a linear or otherwise simplistic manner17.  
                                                       
16 Smith’s conceptualisation of the spontaneous order society – or the Great Society, as he also called it – stands in a long tradition of 
thought that recognised this third category of regularity in society, starting with the 16th-century “School of Salamanca” at the summit of 
scholastic  philosophy  (Barry,  1982).  After  Smith,  the  crucial  figures  in  this  literature  were  Menger  and  Hayek,  but  also  Friedman, 
Buchanan, Wagner and others in the Public Choice, New Institutional and Chicago traditions.  
17  If  current  decisions  have  nonlinear  and  unexpected  consequences,  it  is  impossible  to  map  present  conditions  linearly  onto  past 
decisions.   
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My colleague Basil Moore has recently described systems that show these characteristics as complex adaptive 
systems (Moore, 2006) and there is now an expanding literature in economics which applies the insights from 
complexity theory to social settings (Hayek, 1974 [1989] ; Rosser, 1999).  
 
An important insight of this literature is that the social order, including all the transactions in a market, is an 
emergent property, the features of which cannot be known in advance. A second insight from this literature is the 
difficulty (indeed one could say the impossibility) that any single decision-maker in such a system would have to 
collect sufficient information to mimic the system, or to anticipate the unintended consequences of a system-wide 
intervention.  
 
These new insights have helped to revitalise the invisible hand tradition in economics and have also re-opened 
many policy issues (Rosser, 1999). This does not mean that there is no role for government policy, or merely a 
minimalist role: the efficiency of the institutional framework might be greatly affected by government, as I had 
argued above with respect to Sweden’s monetary policy regime experiments (see also, du Plessis, 2005). And 
government can sometimes participate in a limited way as one of the areas of planning in the market, for example 
with the provision of particular education services. A problem arises however when government strives for a 
more comprehensive plan, especially where this plan undermines the other of areas of planning in the economy, 
or when it debilitates the flow of information.  
 
To make this less abstract let us return to the example of medicines prices. The proposed regulations create both 
problems  just  mentioned. First,  it undermines  the  areas  of  planning  we know as private sector  pharmacies. 
Individual decision-makers can only participate in the competitive process if they are able to exchange, and that 
requires security of contract and property rights. This speaks directly to the Constitutional Court’s disregard for 
the regulatory taking implied by the price control: by failing to protect the value of businesses against regulatory 
takings, the Court has undermined the very feedback mechanism which generates the dynamic capacity of the 
social order.  
 
Second, substituting the pricing committee for the price mechanism undermines the flow of information in the 
pharmaceuticals market. This committee faces the task of gathering and then internalising all the information held 
by the separate pharmacies in the country, and then to reflect this knowledge in the schedule for dispensing fees. 
 
Our first concern with the committee assuming this task might involve the sheer volume of information at stake. 
Though a mammoth task, it is, in a sense only a practical problem and perhaps with sufficient computing power it 
might be resolved, just as Kasparov was eventually beaten in a standard match by IBM’s Deep Blue. A second 
concern is more fundamental: the calculations of the pricing committee are indeed objective in so far as they try 
to calculate a dispensing fee that would allow pharmacies to earn a reasonable rate of return on invested capital. 
But this calculation is the “antithesis of the market function of price”, in the words of Vernon Smith (2003: 473), 
since costs and price are subjective variables for the individual pharmacy, the pricing structure of which will  
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emerge with the spontaneous order. There is no one pricing structure that could be appropriate for many firms, 




But  the  most  fundamental  concern  is  that  even  with perfect  knowledge  and  even  with  limitless  computing 
capacity, the pricing committee could still not mimic the decentralised system. If the spontaneous order society is 
truly a complex adaptive system, then the very configuration of society changes as we follow what we think are 
our best strategies, given the knowledge at our disposal and the goals we wish to pursue. James Buchanan has, to 
my knowledge, said this most clearly:  
 
…the  ‘order’  of  the  market  emerges  only  from  the  process  of  voluntary  exchange  among  the 
participating individuals.  The  ‘order’ is, itself, defined as  the outcome of  the  process that  generates 
it…The potential participants do not know until they enter the process what their own choices will be. 
(Buchanan, 1982 [1999]: 244-245) 
 
The critical distinction that Buchanan (1982 [1999]) wishes to emphasise here is between “process” and “end-
state”. The “invisible hand” is a process, and we cannot conceptualise how even an omniscient planner could 
mimic that process: as the order of the process will only emerge in its unfolding. Nor can this process be 
described as preservative of the status quo; strictly speaking there is no status quo in a complex system. 
 
This critical perspective on the task assumed by the Department of Health’s pricing committee should not leave 
you pessimistic about the spontaneous order society or especially about the scope for improvement via policy. 
Such an impression would be wrong for two reasons: the first is that the spontaneous order society, or the market 
economy as we know it, is an incredibly dynamic process which has proven to be highly responsive to the needs 
of all members of the society. It is a highly progressive system and the just more than 200 years of its existence 
has seen the greatest material advance in the history of human kind, the greatest improvement in health and in 
the  broad  participation  of  all  members  of  society  in  these  advances.  And  these  sustained  gains  are  more 
impressive  still  when  contrasted  with  the  highly  episodic  character  of  growth  and  the  pervasive  material 
stagnation over the remainder of human history (Diamond, 1997; Landes, 1998; Maddison, 2002).  
 
The  quotation  from  Hayek  that  I  placed  at  the  top  of  my  text  summarises  this  penetrating,  though 
counterintuitive, idea, as Hayek said:  
 
“Compared with this method of solving the economic problem by means of decentralisation plus automatic co-
ordination, the more obvious method of central direction is incredibly clumsy, primitive and limited in scope.” 
Friedrich Hayek (1944: 37) 
 
For the first time in human history, the advance of some do not have to occur at the cost of others (North,  
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2005); we can conceive of a positive sum game in which there is considerable scope for helping the disadvantaged 
by creating equality of opportunity and by ensuring fair process. The main line of economic thought which has 
explored the spontaneous order of a decentralised society has always been optimistic, and for good reason. It is 
only a strong commitment to centralised or paternalistic interventions, such as Carlyle’s, that finds in the council 




Many of us, myself included, look to the future in this country and on this continent with optimism, and my 
lecture was intended to strengthen that optimism, not by saying: look what we can do if only we unite our 
resources,  thoughts,  identities,  and  plan  for  the  good  of  the  cause.  There  is  no  need  to  repeat  the  usually 
frustrating and frequently tragic experiments down that road. Instead I argued that our optimism should be based 
on an understanding of the spontaneous market order where, sometimes together in larger or smaller groups, and 
often separately, we pursue those goals each of us value and so allow ourselves to be guided by an invisible hand 
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